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Abstract 
 
Comparing two generations at the same point in their life-cycles, four decades apart, indicates 
that average giving to charitable organizations (not including congregations) by Baby Boom 
families has remained roughly in line with the level of giving done by the Greatest and Silent 
generations, but that average giving by GenX and Millennial families is lower. All three 
generations exhibit the confluence of two divergent trends: lower percentages who give large 
amounts, but among families who do give large amounts, levels of giving compared to donors in 
previous generations are similar if not higher. The two divergent trends also characterize giving 
to religious congregations. Although “dollars per donor holding steady or up” describes 
Millennial, GenX and Baby Boom families compared to the Greatest and Silent generations, 
when the former three generations are compared to each other there are some indications that 
average giving among donors is starting to slip. 
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1. Introduction 
Western democracies rely on charitable organizations to provide public goods to degrees 
that differ across countries (Anheier & Salamon, 2006). In countries placing more emphasis on 
government provision of public goods it is necessary to build majority political support to effect 
a change from the current provision level of public goods in either direction, up or down. 
Without political action the public good provision level does not automatically change. In 
contrast, in countries relying more heavily on charitable organizations, such as the United States 
(e.g. see Brown, Einolf, & Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2015), generational succession can automatically 
affect public good provision: if a previous generation is followed by a rising one whose 
voluntary giving is less, then all else equal the level of public goods provided by charitable 
organizations will be lower. In such countries it is important for charitable organizations to 
anticipate the direction of generational succession in giving so that they can respond. 
Accordingly, there is intense interest in the giving patterns of rising generations (e.g. Bhagat, 
Loeb, & Rovner, 2010; Center on Philanthropy, 2008; Charities Aid Foundation of America, 
2015; Eisenberg, 2013).  
Despite the importance of, and interest in, knowing how generational succession is 
affecting giving, there is little evidence about succession. This is because evidence about 
succession requires data measuring the giving of a previous generation at a point in time decades 
ago when they were at ages in their life-cycle that match the ages at which a rising generation is 
today. Although the Philanthropy Panel Study (Indiana University Lilly Family School of 
Philanthropy, 2015) has measured the giving of American families since 2001, data measuring 
the giving of previous generations are scarce. To our knowledge the only attempt to use such 
data from the U.S. was by Wilhelm, Rooney, & Tempel (2007) who found that giving to 
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charitable organizations by the Baby Boom generation in 2000 when they were ages 35-49 was 
in line with the level of giving done by previous generations in 1973 when they were 35-49, but 
that giving to religious congregations was lower. However, there is no corresponding evidence 
describing America’s current rising generations, Generation X and the Millennials. Also, it is not 
known whether giving to charitable organizations by the Baby Boom since 2000 has remained in 
line with previous generations, or not. 
 There is reason to think that American Millennial and GenX families may be departing 
from the giving pattern seen in the Baby Boom and previous generations. In the United 
Kingdom, soon after policy-makers signaled a desire to shift away from government provision of 
public goods toward more reliance on charitable organizations (Brindle, 2010), Smith (2012) 
found that smaller percentages of people in rising generations were giving to charitable 
organizations than in the generations they were following (see Cowley, McKenzie, Pharoah, & 
Smith, 2011 for more details). For example, in 2010 the percentage among GenX people ages 
30-44 who had given to a charitable organization in the past two weeks was 25 percent, 
compared to 34 percent among people from the Silent generation (and the first few years of the 
Baby Boom) in 1980 when they were 30-44.  
This paper describes generational succession in American giving using the National 
Study of Philanthropy to measure the giving of American families from the Greatest and Silent 
generations in 1973 and seven waves of the Philanthropy Panel Study to measure the giving of 
families from the Baby Boom, GenX and Millennial generations over 2000-2012. The ages of 
the 1973 generation are aligned to the ages of the generation in the 2000s so that the giving of 
both generations is measured at comparable ages in their life-cycles. We analyze giving to 
charitable organizations whose primary purposes are helping people in need, health, education, 
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youth and family services, international aid, the environment, the arts, and community 
improvement. Giving to religious congregations is analyzed separately. There are four main 
results. First, giving to charitable organizations by Baby Boom families has remained roughly in 
line with the level of giving done by the Greatest and Silent generations four decades ago. 
Second, and in contrast, giving to charitable organizations by GenX and Millennial families 
appears to be lower. Third, these results emerge from the confluence of two divergent trends: the 
percentage of families who give large amounts (by which we mean over $600, roughly speaking) 
is much lower in the Baby Boom, GenX and Millennial generations compared to what it was in 
the Greatest and Silent generations, but among Baby Boom, GenX and Millennial families who 
do give large amounts, the level of giving is in line with donors from previous generations, if not 
higher. In other words, the description of generational succession in giving to charitable 
organizations appears to be “(the number of) donors down, dollars per donor holding steady or 
up.” 
Fourth, giving by all three rising generations to congregations is lower. Once again, 
however, this result emerges from the same confluence of two divergent trends: donors down, 
dollars per donor holding steady or up. 
Relative to Wilhelm et al. (2007) our contribution is to present comparisons across five 
generations, instead of just two. For the U.S. these comparisons are the first generation 
succession results describing GenX and the Millennials. A second contribution relative to 
Wilhelm et al. (2007) is that we present results about percentages in each generation who donate 
and the average amounts given by donors. It is this contribution that leads to our “donors down, 
dollars per donors holding steady” conclusion. Relative to Smith (2012) our contribution, in 
addition to the American context of course, is to separately analyze giving to charitable 
4 
 
organizations and giving to congregations. The evidence from the U.K. also indicates “donors 
down, pounds per donor up,” suggesting that this pattern of generational succession is broader 
than a single country context. We return to this in the Discussion. 
The results are significant for practitioners. Of course, practitioners are well-aware that 
the giving patterns of GenX and Millennials are important, but our results suggest that 
practitioners can anticipate that giving levels from these rising generations may not be in line 
with what they have been expecting. More importantly, and we hope more helpfully, the results 
provide some indication about a successful practitioner response. The results suggest that a 
response based on encouraging current donors to give more may be unrealistic because current 
donors are already giving at the same or higher levels than donors from previous generations. A 
response based on the difficult work of engaging new donors may be the best path forward. 
Finally, the results also contribute to the larger literature describing generational succession in a 
range of attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Hout & Fischer, 2014; Taylor, 2014).  
2. Theory and literature review 
Numerous events combine to influence a generation’s ethos, its attitudes and behavioral 
patterns. Wars, economic distress and political crises—shocks to the society—influence a 
generation’s ethos long after the events themselves have passed. The response to shocks by 
society and its institutions, and whether that response is deemed successful or not, further 
influence generational ethos. Generational theory links these events, shocks and responses to 
attitudes and behaviors that are seen as emblematic of the generation’s ethos. In this section we 
describe generational ethos as we see it, and discuss how it might connect to generational 
patterns in charitable giving. 
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The defining events of the Greatest generation (born 1927 and earlier) were the Great 
Depression and World War II. Both were cataclysms of such magnitude that it is hard to imagine 
how the generation could have come through without a socially unified response. Although the 
years of suffering were harsh and long, the federal government’s responses were eventually 
deemed a success: the Depression was overcome; the War was won. And institutions were 
created, such as Social Security and a strong military, that realistically held out the promise that 
the country was better-prepared should the future bring cataclysms of similar magnitude. 
Unifying to achieve common purposes, and having confidence that institutions could achieve 
those purposes, understandably became part of the Greatest generation’s ethos. Putnam (2000, 
pp. 268-276) relates a similar narrative. 
The benefits of common purpose and institutions also became part of the Silent 
generation’s (born 1928-1945) ethos. The Silent generation’s childhood and adolescent 
formative years were the years just described, plus the subsequent prosperity years of the 1950s. 
By no means were the 1950s free of conflict or worry, but the Silent generation came of age 
having experienced directly, or been told stories about, how common purpose and institutions 
brought their parents through the Great Depression and World War II. The prosperity the Silent 
generation experienced for themselves backed that up. Evidence indicates that compared to the 
generations to follow, the Silent generation had, and has, high confidence (trust) in institutions, 
such as the federal government, organized religion, the military, education, and the scientific 
community (Twenge et al., 2014). Putnam (1995, p.675) referred to both generations, Greatest 
and Silent combined, as the “long civic” generation: “substantially more engaged in community 
affairs and substantially more trusting than those younger than they.”  
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Events to follow worked against the formation of common purpose and confidence in 
institutions among the people born in the Baby Boom (1946-1964). The federal government led 
the country into war in Vietnam and was unable to overcome economic instability in the 1970s. 
Confidence in government and political institutions were further undermined by the Watergate 
scandal. During this time the percentage of people placing a high emphasis on autonomy of 
thought rose from 45% among people born in 1900 to 65% among people born 1945 and after 
(Hout & Fischer, 2014). Indeed, protest movements working against established institutions 
became central to ending the war and achieving progress in civil rights. The percentages 
participating in the institutions of civic life—such as writing a letter to a newspaper, attending a 
public meeting, serving as a committee member for a local organization, etc.—were much lower 
in the Baby Boom than was the case in earlier years among the Greatest and Silent generations 
(this claim is based on lining up the ages at which participation is being measured in Putnam, 
2000, pp.251-252). Evidence indicates confidence in institutions to be at a low among the Baby 
Boom (Twenge et al., 2014). Increasing autonomy of thought (Hoge, Johnson, & Luidens, 1994), 
many churches’ opposition to the anti-war and civil rights movements (Bogaski, 2014; Hadden, 
1969; Marsh, 1997; Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2014; cf. Hoge et al., 1994), and opposition to 
changing attitudes about abortion, extra-marital sex and recreational drug use among many, 
though not all, in the Baby Boom (Putnam, Campbell, & Garrett, 2010) weakened confidence in 
religious institutions.  
This changing generational ethos, begun in the Baby Boom, continues to take hold 
among GenX (born 1965-1980) and the Millennials (born 1981 and after), two generations that 
are less distinct from each other, than are the distinctions between the Greatest, Silent and Baby 
Boom generations. The government response to the September 11 attack—wars in Afghanistan 
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and Iraq begun when the Millennials were adolescents and the oldest GenXers were only 36—
has yet to produce a definitive resolution, and no end is in sight. The response to the 2007 Great 
Recession—which hit the Millennials when they were just entering the labor force and GenXers 
when they were still in the first half of their working years—was a success compared to the 
counterfactual depression that could have happened (Blinder & Zandi, 2015), but a failure in 
terms of communicating that success (Blinder, 2013). Not surprisingly, confidence in institutions 
remains low among GenX and Millennials relative to the Greatest and Silent generations 
(Twenge et al., 2014). In addition, there is weaker confidence in the specific institution that 
embodies the Greatest and Silent generations’ confidence in government: Social Security (35% 
of GenX and 42% of Millennials think they will receive zero retirement dollars from the 
program; Taylor, 2014). The percentage of Millennials anticipating zero dollars from Social 
Security has recently risen to 51% (Pew Research Center, 2014). 
Autonomy of thought remains highly valued among GenX and Millennials, and 
accompanying this are increases in self-centeredness (specifically, narcissism; Twenge et al., 
2008) and decreases in empathic concern for others (Konrath, O’Brien, & Hsing, 2011). 
Participation in the institutions of civic life is even lower, at least among GenX (see 2000, 
pp.251-252; Millennials were too young to be included in this analysis). Confidence in religious 
institutions continues to weaken, as reflected in the rising percentage of Millennials who have no 
denominational preference—35 percent compared to the Baby Boom’s 17 percent and the 
Greatest generation’s eight (Taylor, 2014). This weakening confidence in religious institutions is 
in part a reaction to conservative religious institutions becoming politically more assertive in 
opposing changing attitudes about sex (Hout & Fischer, 2002, 2014; Putnam, Campbell & 
Garrett, 2010; Taylor, 2014, p. 166), and in part because Millennials were raised by the Baby 
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Boom, many of whom had already lost confidence in religious institutions (Hout & Fischer, 
2014, p. 22). Putnam (2000, p. 283) again offers a similar narrative: although time and money 
pressure, suburbanization, commuting, television, and other electronic entertainment have 
contributed to declining civic engagement, the main explanation is generational succession.1 
 Previous evidence connecting generation-to-generation change in ethos—changing from 
common purpose toward increasing autonomy, lower confidence in government, organized 
religion and other institutions—to change in behavior has been based primarily on participation: 
declining number of group memberships (Putnam, 1995), voting (Putnam, 1995), religious 
preference (Hout & Fischer, 2014; Taylor, 2014), attendance at worship services (Wilhelm et al., 
2007; Putnam, 2000, p. 252). In terms of giving behavior, this would seem to imply a decline in 
participation—the percentage who give to charitable organizations—though not necessarily a 
decline in the average amounts given by those who do choose to donate. It may be that 
participation in giving reflects underlying engagement, and among the engaged from one 
generation to the next, donations are little changed. This is in line with pattern described in the 
Introduction: “number of donors down, but dollars-per-donor holding steady”.  
3. Data and methods 
Our method is to compare giving by people of the same age, but from different years 
(hence from different generations), adjusting for inflation and real income growth. In this section 
we provide a basic overview of the data and methods (full details are available in a web 
appendix). 
3.1 Generations and life-cycle stages 
The National Study of Philanthropy describes the giving of American families in 1973 
(Survey Research Center, 1977). The seven biennial waves of the Panel Study of Income 
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Dynamics 2001-2013 describe the giving of American families every other year 2000-2012 
(Survey Research Center, 2015). Both studies measure American giving to a comprehensive set 
of charitable organizations. Among recent studies, only the Panel Study measures giving at the 
top of the distribution well enough to permit comparison to the National Study (Wilhelm, 2007). 
Our approach is to define generational cohorts based on working-age people (ages 25-60) 
in the 1973 National Study and compare them to same-aged people in the Panel Study during 
2000-2012. Specifically, we compare National Study 36-60 year-olds—members of the Greatest 
and Silent generations (1928-37)—to Panel Study respondents aged 36-60—members of the 
Baby Boom. We refer to people aged 36-60 as being in middle and senior adulthood.  
For our analysis of Millennials and GenX, we compare National Study 25-47 year-olds—
members of the Silent generation plus the first three Baby Boom years (1946-48) and last two 
Greatest generation years (1926-27)—to Panel Study respondents aged 25-47—Millennials and 
GenX. We refer to people aged 25-47 as young and middle adults. 
We selected these particular age ranges (25-47 and 36-60), and allowed them to overlap, 
in order to achieve two objectives subject to a constraint. Our first objective was to keep the age 
ranges wide (23 years for the young/middle adults and 25 years for the middle/senior adults). We 
want wide age ranges to maximize statistical power in light of the National Study’s relatively 
small sample size (N = 1,649) which becomes yet smaller upon any splitting into sub-samples by 
age. Narrower age ranges would lead to loss in precision. Our second objective was to keep the 
age ranges fixed between 1973 and 2000-2012. This is obviously necessary for comparisons 
between generations that hold constant the position in the life-cycle. Pursuing these two 
objectives—fixed age ranges that are wide enough to deliver power—implies some mixing of 
generations within the fixed age ranges. Therefore, we constrained our pursuit of the two 
10 
 
objectives by requiring that the mixing of generations remain relatively in-line with the theory 
developed in Section 2. For example, the age range 36-60 during 2000-2012 yields only Baby 
Boomers (no mixing of generations at all) and in 1973 mixes members of the Greatest and Silent 
generations. This mixing is relatively in-line with the Section 2 theory in that the Greatest and 
Silent generations are much more similar to each other than either are to the Baby Boom. 
Readers interested in results with essentially no mixing of generations can find them in the web 
appendix; where such results suggest qualification or nuance to the results presented below for 
25-47 and 36-60 year-olds, we will point that out. 
3.2 Measuring giving 
 The Panel Study queries giving separately by nine purposes of charitable organizations: 
helping people with basic needs, youth and family services, health, education, combined appeals, 
community, cultural, environmental, and international, as well as a “mop-up”/“other” category.  
In Study 1 we aggregate all of this into one category called giving to “charitable organizations”; 
some may prefer the label “non-profit organizations”, and we have no objection to that label. 
Study 2 is about giving for religious purposes/spiritual development. This is measured with a 
question that focuses the respondent’s attention on giving primarily to congregations, but also to 
TV and radio ministries. We refer to these amounts as giving to “congregations”.  
 In the National Study a skip pattern in the questionnaire has implications for how we can 
compare its data to those from the Panel Study. National Study respondents were first asked if 
they had given anything to a religious or other charitable organization. If “yes”, then a second 
question asked if that was more than $100. If the answer to that second question was “no”, then 
all subsequent questions about giving were skipped. Only if the answer to the $100 question was 
“yes” did subsequent questions determine whether the person (a) gave specifically to charitable 
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organizations, (b) gave specifically to religious congregations, and (c) the separate amounts 
given to each of (a) and (b). To maintain comparability across the National and Panel Studies, we 
follow Wilhelm et al. (2007) and artificially impose this same information restriction on the 
Panel Study respondents. 
3.3 Methods 
 Continuing to follow Wilhelm et al. (2007), amounts given in 1973 dollars from the 
National Study are adjusted forward to 2012 to account for both inflation and real income 
growth. For example, the inflation/real growth adjustment for 36-60 year-olds from 1973 to 
2012—a factor of 6.16—yields an amount that reflects expectations of what the giving of 36-60 
year-olds in 2012 would look like if all that had changed were inflation and real growth. In short, 
those expectations, and our results, are about generational succession in giving as a percentage of 
income available to each generation, even though we present the results in dollar terms to ease 
discussion. We adjust the Panel Study data similarly, and express all results in 2012 terms. 
We report estimates of giving averaged across all members of a generational cohort, 
including both donors and non-donors, just as in Wilhelm et al. (2007). In addition, we extend 
their work by presenting estimates of percentages in each generation who give and the average 
amount given by the donors. Here again, the National Study’s skip pattern has implications for 
the comparisons we can carry out. For a donor in the National Study who gave less than $100, 
we do not know for sure whether the person gave to charitable organizations because he/she 
could have donated only to religious congregations. However, if the donor gave more than $100, 
then we do know the amounts they gave separately to charitable organizations and 
congregations. Hence, in the National Study we can estimate the fraction of people who both (a) 
gave to charitable organizations and (b) who gave large amounts (more than $100) to charitable 
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organizations and religious congregations combined. Again, we impose this same information 
restriction on the Panel Study respondents: continuing with the comparison to 36-60 year-olds 
from 1973, we estimate the fraction of Panel Study 36-60 year olds who both (a) gave to 
charitable organizations and (b) who gave more than $616 ($1001973 dollars times the 6.16 
adjustment factor) to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined.  
 A second extension is that we examine two “near-term” generation-to generation 
comparisons: Millennials compared to GenX in young adulthood and GenX compared to the 
Baby Boom in middle adulthood. Because these comparisons do not require the National Study 
we can compare the percentages who give any amount, not just large amounts, to charitable 
organizations (or to congregations), and the average amounts given by them. To distinguish these 
near-term comparisons from those involving the 1973 National Study, we will refer to the latter 
as “long-term” comparisons. 
We present weighted averages, just as in Wilhelm et al. (2007). The National Study 
weights adjust for the high-income oversample. The Panel Study weights adjust for attrition and 
mortality over time. A third extension relative to Wilhelm et al. (2007) is the greater precision in 
the Panel Study estimates due to our use of seven waves from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. We pool the seven waves, and calculate clustered standard errors.  
4. Results 
Study 1: Charitable organizations 
 In Table 1 we begin with the long-term generation-to-generation comparison in Panel 1. 
Row 1 column 1 indicates that 25-47 year-olds in 1973 on average gave $624 (in 2012 terms) to 
charitable organizations. The estimate in column 2 indicates that average giving among people 
ages 25-47 in the 2000s (Millennial young adults and GenX young/middle adults) is $443. The 
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difference in column 3 indicates that the Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults are giving $180 
less than would have been expected based on the $624 estimated average giving of those in 1973 
at the same point in their life-cycle, mostly members of the Silent generation (to ease discussion, 
we will refer to this group simply as the “Silent generation”). The $180 difference is precisely 
estimated (two-sided p = .005).2 
 Row 2 presents percentages who give to charitable organizations (and who give large 
amounts to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined): this percentage is 
down 18 points among Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults (column 3), and is precisely 
estimated (p < .001). Hence, donors down. In contrast, row 3 suggests Millennial/GenX–
young/middle adults who do give large amounts and who give to charitable organizations are, if 
anything, giving higher amounts (+$222, p = .138) than expected compared to the Silent 
generation in 1973. Although the +$222 is notable in magnitude, it is not precisely enough 
estimated to claim two-sided statistical significance; accordingly we make the weaker claim that 
dollars per donor are holding steady, if not up.3 
 Results for Baby Boom–middle/senior adults (columns 4-6) begin with a difference: 
average giving is essentially in line with expectations (−$52, p = .585) based on the 
Greatest/Silent generation middle/senior adults in 1973. However, seven percentage points fewer 
are giving to charitable organizations (and giving large amounts, p < .001).  And again, among 
those donors, average amounts given are, if anything, higher (+$174, p = .319). Donors down. 
Dollars per donor holding steady if not up. 
Panel 2 presents “near-term” generation-to generation comparisons of giving to charitable 
organizations. Row 1, columns 1-3 indicate that Millennial young adults are giving less on 
average (−$92, p = .001) than did GenX young adults. Row 2 indicates that the percentage of 
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Millennial young adults who give to charitable organizations (who give large amounts) is four 
points lower than the percentage of GenX doing the same as young adults (p = .005). Such 
Millennial donors are giving $262 lower amounts, on average, than did the comparison GenX 
young adults (p = .035); this is in contrast to the +$222 “dollars per donor holding steady” result 
seen in Panel 1 row 3. Hence, while the Millennial–GenX young adulthood comparison still 
indicates “donors down”, there is evidence that dollars per donor are starting to slip. 
 Rows 4 and 5 step back from conditioning on donors who give large amounts, a condition 
required in Panel 1 by the National Study skip pattern, to consider donors of any amounts (over 
$25). Despite removing the “large amount” condition, the results parallel those from rows 2 and 
3 results: the percentage of Millennial young adults who give to charitable organizations is 12 
points lower than the percentage of GenX young adults who did so (p  < .001), and among 
Millennials who give the average amount given is $83 less. Although a two-sided test of the 
−$83 cannot be rejected, a one-sided test of “holding steady or up” can (p = .089). 
 In Panel 2, row 1, columns 4-6 indicate that GenX middle adults are giving $113 less on 
average than did the Baby Boom in middle adulthood (p = .139). The GenX percentage who give 
to charitable organizations (and who give large amounts) is seven points lower than was the case 
among Baby Boom middle adults (p  < .001), but the amounts per donor are essentially the same 
(row 3). Row 4 removes the “large amount” condition to show that the GenX percentage giving 
to charitable organizations is five points lower than in the Baby Boom (p = .008). The average 
amount given per donor is $94 less among GenX donors (row 5; p = .460). 
Study 2: Congregations 
Table 2 presents results about giving to congregations.  In Panel 1, row 1 column 3 
indicates that, on average, Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults are giving $412 less than 
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would have been expected based on the giving to congregations by the Silent generation in 
young and middle adulthood back in 1973 (p < .001). A qualifying nuance to this result is that 
while it certainly applies to GenX middle adults, it applies with less force to young adults, both 
Millennial and GenX.4 Despite this qualification, reading down column 3 the pattern is again 
donors down (by 18 percentage points, p < .001) and dollars per donor up ($170) or in line with 
expectations (because the +$170 is not statistically significant, p = .368). Column 6 indicates 
qualitatively similar results among the Baby Boom in middle and senior adulthood: on average 
$284 less giving to congregations than expected compared to Greatest/Silent adults at the same 
point in their life-cycle in 1973 (p = .018). The percentage who donate to congregations (and 
who give large amounts to charitable organizations and congregations combined) is lower by 
nine percentage points (p < .001), but the average giving of those donors is in line with 
expectations (the +$33 is small in magnitude; p = .886). Donors down. Dollars per donor holding 
steady if not up.5 
Panel 2 presents the “near-term” generation-to generation comparisons. Row 1 column 3 
indicates that Millennial young adults are giving to congregations $78 (p = .219) less than 
expected compared to GenX young adults, three percentage points less likely to give to 
congregations (and give large amounts), and among those donors $49 less (ps = .063, .881). 
Rows 4 and 5 step back from conditioning on the donors who give large amounts and indicate 
eight percentage points fewer giving to congregations (p  < .001) but among donors $175 more 
on average (p = .436). Overall, we see this as evidence of donors down, but dollars per donor 
holding steady (the −$49) or perhaps up (the +$175). 
Continuing in Panel 2 and reading down column 6 indicates qualitatively similar results 
for the GenX–Baby Boom middle adulthood comparison, for the most part, although the 
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magnitudes of the differences are much larger than in column 3. In row 1 GenX middle adults 
are on average giving to congregations $359 less than did Baby Boom middle adults, nine 
percentage points fewer give to congregations (and give large amounts) (p < .001), and among 
those donors giving is $378 less (p = .112). Rows 4 and 5 indicate that eight percentage points 
fewer GenX middle adults give to congregations (p < .001), and among these donors average 
giving is $457 less than Baby Boom donors to congregations (p = .018): “donors down” and 
evidence that dollars per donor are also down. 
5. Discussion 
The results indicate that Millennial and GenX young and middle adults, as a group, are 
giving to charitable organizations less than expected compared to (mostly) Silent generation 
young and middle adults from 1973. In contrast, Baby Boom adults, both middle and senior, are 
giving to charitable organizations in line with expectations based on their Silent/Greatest 
generation counterparts in 1973. Both of these results, despite their difference with respect to 
each other, arise from two unambiguous trends: the percentage of donors is down, while the 
dollars per donor are, at a minimum, in line with expectations, if not higher. Turning to the near-
term generation-to-generation comparisons, the evidence indicates that the first of these trends—
donors down—is continuing. However the second trend—dollars per donor holding steady or 
up—is starting to slip among Millennial young adults: this is clearly the case among large donors 
and among all donors recall that a one-sided test of “holding steady or up” can be rejected. 
Giving to congregations is down among both Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults 
(however, recall the possible qualifications to this result mentioned for young adults) and Baby 
Boom middle and senior adults, compared to their 1973 Silent generation counterparts. Again, 
the confluence of two divergent trends produces these results: the percentage of donors is down, 
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while the dollars per donor are in line with expectations if not higher. Turning to the near-term 
generation-to-generation comparisons, once again the evidence indicates that the first of these 
trends—donors down—is continuing, but the second—dollars per donor holding steady—is 
starting to slip among GenX middle adults. 
The Baby Boom results indicate that the main result from Wilhelm et al. (2007)—that on 
average giving to charitable organizations was in line with the giving done by previous 
generations, but that giving to congregations was lower—continues to hold as the Baby Boom 
cohort has aged. The “donors down” result across all generational groups is similar to Smith’s 
(2012) finding from the U.K. This suggests that generational succession in terms of lower 
percentages who give appears to be a wider phenomenon than in just the U.K. or the U.S. alone. 
And it indicates that generational succession is largely about how a gap within each generation 
between families that donate and families that do not is changing. Hence, a central question for 
future research is to understand the characteristics describing the missing donors within each 
generation. 
There are two limitations to these results that are important to keep in mind. First, the 
Millennials in this study are in their very first years of young adulthood, just establishing their 
own households apart from their families of origin, and doing so in the midst and aftermath of 
the Great Recession. Therefore, what we have reported here about Millennial giving may not be 
an indication of their future giving behavior as they move into middle adulthood years, years that 
also will be further removed from the Great Recession.6 Second, our results about “typical” 
American families do not necessarily pertain to the top two percent (Wilhelm et al., 2007). 
Although we do not know one way or the other, it is possible that giving by the top two percent 
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is counterbalancing some of the patterns we have described. Future work is needed to address 
these limitations.  
The pattern of results is in line with Section 2’s description of generational ethos 
changing from common purpose toward increasing autonomy and toward lower confidence in 
institutions. Of course, other explanations are possible, such as rising inequality or demographic 
change, and these suggest areas for future research. For instance, women are playing a more 
prominent role in terms of earning income and making financial decisions within couples: Do the 
patterns reported here play out differently for single women and men, and within couples using 
different decision-making approaches to charitable giving? 
The results have two implications. First, conceptually the results remind us that, while 
stability in overall averages often is implicitly taken as absence of change underneath, it is not 
necessarily so. There are many counter-examples in the present results. Even the direction of 
change in the average does not imply the same directions of change for the percentage who 
donate and the dollars per donating family—counter-example: Millennial/GenX–young/middle 
adult giving to charitable organizations (Table 1, Panel 1). Even a “no change” in a simple 
average does not indicate the absence of change when income and wealth are controlled for—
counter-example: most of our results about average giving being in line with (or lower than) 
expectations would have been lower than (or more dramatically lower than) expectations had it 
not been for rising incomes and wealth in the Baby Boom and GenX generations (Blinder-
Oaxaca decompositions are available in the web appendix). 
Second, the results alert practitioners in charitable organizations that the average giving 
of GenX and Millennial families is lower relative to expectations based on previous generations. 
Our results that dollars per donor are in line with expectations, if not higher, suggests that a 
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response based on trying to persuade already donating families to donate more will not be 
successful. A successful response needs to be based on understanding the reasons why the 
percentages of GenX and Millennial families who donate are down. Because the percentage of 
Baby Boom families who donate also is down, the question may not be “why are percentages of 
donors among the Baby Boom, GenX and Millennial families down?” but rather might be “why 
were percentages of donors among the Greatest and Silent generations up?” 
Finally, we close with a caution. All too often results along the lines that we have 
presented here are used explicitly, or implicitly, to criticize the giving behavior of the group 
found to be giving lower amounts. Such use is not helpful, because it gets in the way of 
understanding the reasons why the results are occurring. It should be kept in mind that young and 
middle-aged adults in the 2000s are facing different circumstances than faced by previous 
generations. For instance, a GenX middle adult in our study (born 1970) has a 61 percent chance 
of earning more income than his/her parents, dramatically lower than the 92 percent chance a 
Silent generation middle adult (born 1940) had of doing the same (Chetty et al., 2016). It may be 
that lower income expectations (relative to one’s parents) and lower confidence in Social 
Security has made young and middle-aged adults more hesitant in their present day giving 
behavior. Work to understand the reasons why can help practitioners take those realities into 
consideration as they build relationships with GenX and Millennial families. Criticizing their 
giving behavior instead of working to understand it is an obstacle to building those relationships. 
6. Conclusion 
Using two data sources collected four decades apart this paper has provided evidence 
about generation-to-generation change in giving. Among Baby Boom families average giving to 
charitable organizations is in line with expectations based on previous generations four decades 
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ago. Among Millennial and GenX families average giving is lower. Although these patterns of 
generation-to-generation change are different among the Baby Boom and Millennial/GenX, they 
share in common two underlying trends: the percentage who donate are down, while the dollars 
given by families who do donate are in line with expectations if not higher. Donors down, dollars 
per donor holding steady or up. Donors down/dollars per donor holding steady or up also 
describes giving to congregations. 
When we turn to “near-term” generation-to-generation change, a difference relative to the 
results just described begins to emerge: while there is still strong evidence of “donors down”, 
there are signs that “dollars per donor steady or up” is starting to slip. In other words, there is 
evidence that dollars per donor are starting to fall among Millennial young adults giving to 
charitable organizations and GenX middle adults giving to congregations. 
These results suggest that maintaining levels of charitable giving, and in turn the public 
goods charitable organizations provide with those funds, will require the difficult work of 
understanding why the percentages of donors are down, and using that understanding to expand 
the number of new donors. Because dollars per donor are holding steady or up, we think there is 
little room to maintain levels of charitable giving in the face of declining percentages who give, 
by encouraging current donors to give even higher amounts. That said, a careful eye should be 
kept on dollars per donor, because the “near-term” results suggest that may be starting to slip. 
Finally, the results suggest that underneath the seemingly unchanging level of American 
generosity—giving to charitable organizations plus congregations as a percentage of disposable 
personal income has remained approximately at two percent year in and year out over the four 
decades of the present study (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2016, p. 
327)—important dynamic changes are underway.
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Notes 
 
1 Not all agree that the overall decline in confidence in institutions and civic engagement implies 
a decline in confidence specifically in charitable organizations. Reports of low confidence in 
charitable organizations (Light, 2008) are not supported by careful analysis of the data (O’Neill, 
2008). Moreover, data on confidence in charitable organizations go back only to the late 1980s 
(see O’Neill, Table 1), making it impossible to say anything about generation-to-generation 
change in confidence in charitable organizations stretching back to the 1970s and earlier. 
2 The $180 appears to be one dollar off from the $624 − $443 difference because of round-off 
error. This happens several times throughout the paper. 
3 The +$222 is notable/important in practical terms because it is a very large difference relative 
to the baseline $1,369 (Table 1, Panel 1, row 3, column 1). Although with the +$222 a one-sided 
null hypothesis that dollars per donor have fallen (or have not changed) can be rejected (one-
sided p = .069), our view is that that is less important than both the large magnitude of the +$222 
difference and how that magnitude fits in with the overall pattern to be presented. See 
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) and Ziliak and McCloskey (2004) for a compelling argument that 
in non-experimental research a narrow focus on precision (statistical significance) can cause one 
to overlook important magnitudes and overall patterns of evidence. 
4 The result does not apply to GenX young adults, and does not apply as strongly to Millennial 
young adults, if one influential observation is excluded when estimating the 1973 average 
(results available in the web appendix). 
5 The $284 average less than expected is consistent with the result from Wilhelm et al. (2007) 
that Baby Boom adults aged 35-49 in 2000 were giving $202 less than expected to 
congregations, compared to 35-49 year olds in 1973 (members of the Silent generation 1928-
1938 and the Greatest generation 1924-1927). The $202 was in 2000 terms, and expressing it in 
2012 terms using our adjustments = $272. 
66 For GenX middle adults and Baby Boom senior adults the data allow us to confirm that the 
results are not being driven by lower average giving in the Great Recession/recovery years, but 
we cannot perform this sensitivity check for Millennial young adults (results available in the web 
appendix).  Also available in the web appendix are sensitivity checks we carried out regarding 
influential observations and an alternative measure of giving to congregations, neither of which 
affected the results. 
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Table 1. Giving to charitable organizations. 
 
Panel 1. Long-term generation comparison. 
    
Silenta Millennial /      GenX Difference 
  
Greatest / 
Silent Baby Boom Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
=(2) – (1) 
  
=(5) – (4) 
 Giving 
Young and middle 
 
Middle and senior 
Adulthood (ages 25-47) Adulthood (ages 36-60) 
(1) Average by all households 
624 443 –180***d  932 880 –52 
(516, 731) (380, 507) (–305, –55) 
 
(773, 1091) (778, 981) (–136, 241) 
(2) Fraction who give large amountsb 
0.45 0.28 –.18***   0.51 0.44 –.07*** 
(.42, .48) (.26, .29) (–.21, –.14) 
 
(.48, .54) (.42, .46) (–.10, –.03) 
(3) Average among those in row (2) 
1369 1591 222  1828 2002 174 
(1163, 1576) (1383, 1799) (–71, 515)   (1562, 2094) (1787, 2217) (–168, 516) 
 
Panel 2. Near-term generation comparison. 
  
  
GenX Millennial       Difference 
  
Baby Boom GenX Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
=(2) – (1) 
  
=(5) – (4) 
Giving Young adulthood (ages 25-31)   Middle Adulthood (ages 36-47) 
(1) Average by all households 
250 159 –92***  736 623 –113 
(204, 297) (127, 190) (–148, –36) (634, 838) (512, 733) (–264, 37) 
(2) 0.21 0.17 –.04***  0.42 0.35 –.07*** 
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Fraction who give 
large amountsc (.19, .23) (.14, .19) (–.07, –.01) 
 
(.39, .44) (.32, .37) (–.11, –.03) 
(3) Average among those in row (2) 
1179 917 –262**  1770 1802 31 
(985, 1373) (769, 1065) (–506, –19) (1550, 1991) (1505, 2098) (–338, 400) 
(4) Fraction who give any amounts. 
0.49 0.37 –.12***  0.61 0.56 –.05*** 
(.47, .51) (.34, .40) (–.16, –.08) (.59, .64) (.53, .59) (–.09, –.01) 
(5) Average among those  in row (4) 
510 427 –83  1202 1109 –94 
(418, 603) (350, 504) (–203, 37)   (1043, 1362) (917, 1300) (–343, 155) 
Notes: Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are in parentheses. *** p < .01, **  p  < .05, *  p  < .10. 
Influential observations are not included in the estimates of average giving by the Silent and Greatest/Silent generations. Influential observations are 
included in the estimates of average giving by the Millennial, GenX and Baby Boom generations. Influential observations are defined to be giving 
amounts above $50,000 in 2012 terms. The number of influential observations for giving to charitable organizations that are not included: 
Greatest/Silent middle and senior adults—two. 
a Also includes 1926-27 of the Greatest generation and 1946-48 of the Baby Boom. 
b “Who give large amounts” means those who give $100 or more in 1973 terms to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined. In 
2012 terms, that is $589 for young and middle adulthood (columns 1 and 2) and $616 for middle and senior adulthood (columns 4 and 5). 
c “Who give large amounts” means those who give $100 or more in 1973 terms to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined. In 
2012 terms, that is $513 for young Millennial adults (column 1), $566 for young GenX adults (column 2), and $589 for GenX and Boomer middle 
adults (column 4 and 5).                                                                                                                                                
d The $180 appears to be one dollar off from the difference $624 − $443 because of round-off error. This happens several times throughout the 
paper. 
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Table 2. Giving to congregations.  
 
Panel 1. Long-term generation comparison. 
  
Silenta Millennial /      GenX Difference  
Greatest / 
Silent Baby Boom Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
=(2) – (1) 
  
=(5) – (4) 
 Giving 
Young and middle 
 
Middle and senior 
Adulthood (ages 25-47) Adulthood (ages 36-60) 
(1) Average by all households 
1013 601 –412***  1552 1268 –284** 
(883, 1143) (526, 676) (–562, –262) 
 
(1364, 1740) (1127, 1408) (–519, –49) 
(2) Fraction who give large amountsb 
0.41 0.23 –.18***  0.47 0.38 –.09*** 
(.38, .44) (.21, .24) (–.22, –.15) 
 
(.43, .50) (.36, .40) (–.12, –.05) 
(3) Average among those in row (2) 
2464 2633 170  3339 3373 33 
(2213, 2715) (2361, 2905) (–200, 539)   (3023, 3656) (3043, 3703) (–491, 424) 
Panel 2. Near-term generation comparison. 
  
  
GenX Millennial       Difference 
  
Baby Boom GenX Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
=(2) – (1) 
  
=(5) – (4) 
Giving Young adulthood (ages 25-31)   Middle Adulthood (ages 36-47) 
(1) Average by all households 
461 383 –78  1073 715 –359*** 
(379, 542) (290, 476) (–201, 46) 
 
(935, 1212) (603, 826) (–537, –181 ) 
(2) Fraction who give large amountsc 
0.18 0.15 –.03*  0.36 0.28 –.09*** 
(.15, .20) (.13, .18) (–.06, –.002) (.34, .39) (.25, .30) (–.12, –.05) 
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(3) Average among those  in row (2) 
2523 2474 –49  2968 2590 –378 
(2166, 2880) (1943, 3004) (–687, 590) (2640, 3295) (2258, 2921) (–844, 88) 
(4) Fraction who give any amounts  
0.31 0.23 –.08***  0.46 0.38 –.08*** 
(.28, .33) (.20, .26) (–.11, –.04) (.43, .49) (.35, .41) (–.12, –.04) 
(5) Average among those  in row (4) 
1498 1673 175  2324 1867 –457** 
(1258, 1737) (1303, 2043) (–266, 615)   (2052, 2596) (1604, 2130) (–835, –78) 
Notes: Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are in parentheses. *** p < .01, **  p  < .05, *  p  < .10.   
The number of influential observations for giving to congregations that are not included: (a) Silent young and middle adults—one; (b) 
Greatest/Silent middle and senior adults—three. See Table 1 for additional notes about influential observations. 
a,b,c See the notes in Table 1. 
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 This document contains supplemental material for “Generational succession in American 
giving”.  Appendix A presents the generation–life-cycle stage–calendar year–age range 
relationships we can investigate with the National and Panel Studies. 
 
Appendix B contains the full methodological detail necessary for replication. This 
includes the factors used to adjust the data to 2012 terms, the definition of potentially influential 
observations, and how we clustered the standard errors.  
 Appendix C examines the sensitivity of the main text’s results in Panel 1 (from both 
Tables 1 and 2) to separating the generations into five separate generation–life-cycle groups: 
Millennial young adults, GenX young adults, GenX middle adults, Baby Boom middle adults 
and Baby Boom senior adults. These sensitivity results are presented in Appendix B’s Figures 1-
6. The figures, and the accompanying discussion, describe the effects of including/excluding the 
National Study’s influential observations. 
 
Appendix C also examines the sensitivity of the results to dropping the Great Recession 
years and to an alternative measurement of giving to congregations. 
 
Finally, Appendix C contains the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition: a decomposition of the 
generation-to-generation change in average giving into a part due to generation-to-generation 
change in income and wealth and a part due to generation-to-generation change in how much is 
given at each level of income and wealth. 
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Appendix A. Generations and life-cycle stages. 
 
Table A1 presents the generation–life-cycle stage–calendar year–age range relationships 
we can study. Millennials in young adulthood first appear in the Panel Study in 2006, when 
people born in 1981 reached age 25. In subsequent years the age range of Millennial young 
adults included in the analysis expands, so that by 2012 ages 25-31 are included. GenX young 
adults appear in the Panel Study in 2000 when people born in 1969-1975 were ages 25-31. In 
subsequent years as those people age, the number of GenX young adults in the study declines; by 
2012 there are none remaining. GenX middle adults are ages 32-35 in 2000, expanding to ages 
32-47 by 2012 (the entire GenX 1965-1980 cohort). Baby Boom middle adults are 36-47 in 
2000. As these people age, the number of Baby Boom middle adults declines. Baby Boom senior 
adults are ages 48-54 in 2000, expanding to ages 48-60 by 2006. 
The bottom of Table A1 presents the Silent (1928-1945) and Greatest (1927 and before) 
generations, whose 1973 giving was measured in the National Study. Young adults aged 25-31 in 
1973 were a combination of people born in the last four years of the Silent generation (1942-
1945) and the first three years of the Baby Boom (1946-1948).  Middle adults aged 32-47 in 
1973 were predominantly from the Silent generation, but also included the last two years of the 
Greatest generation. Finally, senior adults in 1973 were born 1913-1925, all members of the 
Greatest generation. 
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Table A1.  Generations, their life-cycle stages, and their ages in the calendar years in which giving is measured. 
   Age in 
Generation Birth year 1973   2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Millennial 1987   —   13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
 1986  —  14 16 18 20 22 24 26 
 1985  —  15 17 19 21 23 25 27 
 1984  —  16 18 20 22 24 26 28 
 1983  —  17 19 21 23 25 27 29 
 1982  —  18 20 22 24 26 28 30 
 1981  —  19 21 23 25 27 29 31 
      —                 
GenX 1980   —   20 22 24 26 28 30 32 
 1979  —  21 23 25 27 29 31 33 
 1978  —  22 24 26 28 30 32 34 
 1977  —  23 25 27 29 31 33 35 
 1976  —  24 26 28 30 32 34 36 
 1975  —  25 27 29 31 33 35 37 
 1974  —  26 28 30 32 34 36 38 
 1973  0  27 29 31 33 35 37 39 
 1972  1  28 30 32 34 36 38 40 
 1971  2  29 31 33 35 37 39 41 
 1970  3  30 32 34 36 38 40 42 
 1969  4  31 33 35 37 39 41 43 
 1968  5  32 34 36 38 40 42 44 
 1967  6  33 35 37 39 41 43 45 
 1966  7  34 36 38 40 42 44 46 
 1965  8  35 37 39 41 43 45 47 
                        
Baby 1964   9   36 38 40 42 44 46 48 
Boom 1963  10  37 39 41 43 45 47 49 
 1962  11  38 40 42 44 46 48 50 
 1961  12  39 41 43 45 47 49 51 
 1960  13  40 42 44 46 48 50 52 
 1959  14  41 43 45 47 49 51 53 
 1958  15  42 44 46 48 50 52 54 
 1957  16  43 45 47 49 51 53 55 
 1956  17  44 46 48 50 52 54 56 
 1955  18  45 47 49 51 53 55 57 
 1954  19  46 48 50 52 54 56 58 
 1953  20  47 49 51 53 55 57 59 
 1952  21  48 50 52 54 56 58 60 
 1951  22  49 51 53 55 57 59 61 
 1950  23  50 52 54 56 58 60 62 
 1949  24  51 53 55 57 59 61 63 
 1948  25  52 54 56 58 60 62 64 
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 1947  26  53 55 57 59 61 63 65 
 1946  27  54 56 58 60 62 64 66 
                        
Silent 1945   28   55 57 59 61 63 65 67 
generation 1944  29  56 58 60 62 64 66 68 
 1943  30  57 59 61 63 65 67 69 
 1942  31  58 60 62 64 66 68 70 
 1941  32  59 61 63 65 67 69 71 
 1940  33  60 62 64 66 68 70 72 
 1939  34  61 63 65 67 69 71 73 
 1938  35  62 64 66 68 70 72 74 
 1937  36  63 65 67 69 71 73 75 
 1936  37  64 66 68 70 72 74 76 
 1935  38  65 67 69 71 73 75 77 
 1934  39  66 68 70 72 74 76 78 
 1933  40  67 69 71 73 75 77 79 
 1932  41  68 70 72 74 76 78 80 
 1931  42  69 71 73 75 77 79 81 
 1930  43  70 72 74 76 78 80 82 
 1929  44  71 73 75 77 79 81 83 
 1928  45  72 74 76 78 80 82 84 
                        
Greatest 1927   46   73 75 77 79 81 83 85 
generation 1926  47  74 76 78 80 82 84 86 
 1925  48  75 77 79 81 83 85 87 
 1924  49  76 78 80 82 84 86 88 
 1923  50  77 79 81 83 85 87 89 
 1922  51  78 80 82 84 86 88 90 
 1921  52  79 81 83 85 87 89 91 
 1920  53  80 82 84 86 88 90 92 
 1919  54  81 83 85 87 89 91 93 
 1918  55  82 84 86 88 90 92 94 
 1917  56  83 85 87 89 91 93 95 
 1916  57  84 86 88 90 92 94 96 
 1915  58  85 87 89 91 93 95 97 
 1914  59  86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
  1913   60   87 89 91 93 95 97 99 
Notes:  Generations are color-coded: Millennial (dark green), GenX (red), Baby Boom (blue), Silent (lighter green), Greatest 
(purple). Life-cycle stages are shaded: young adulthood ages 25-31 (light grey), middle adulthood ages 32-47 (blue), senior 
adulthood ages 48-60 (dark grey). The sample sizes (unweighted) in each generation–life-cycle group are: Millennials young 
adults (N = 3,371), GenX young adults (N = 6,399), GenX middle adults (N=12,152; N = 6,781 36-47 year-olds, used in Table 
3), Baby Boom middle adults (N = 7,593), Baby Boom senior adults (N = 13,040), Silent/Boom young adults (N = 388), Silent 
middle adults (N = 618), Greatest senior adults (N = 463). 
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Appendix B. Detailed description of data and methods. 
 
B.1 Generations and life-cycle stages 
Three considerations led us to the definition of five generation–life-cycle stage groups. 
The first two are (1) standard generational definitions (Taylor, 2014). These are: Millennial–born 
1981 and after; GenX: 1965-1980; the Baby Boom: 1946-1964; Silent: 1928-1945; Greatest: 
1913-1927. The second consideration is data availability: 2000-2012. The third consideration 
was requiring people to be 25 and older to avoid complications involving the transition from 
school and families of origin, into work and setting up one’s own household. Likewise, we 
require people to be 60 and younger to avoid complications involving the transition from work to 
retirement. These three considerations—specifying a generation (e.g., Millennial), looking at a 
specific calendar year of the Panel Study (e.g., 2006), and the 25-60 year-old age range, imply 
the specific boundaries of the life-cycle stages, which are young adulthood: 25-31; middle 
adulthood: 32-47; senior adulthood: 48-60. These were displayed in Table A1.  
Recall that for the text’s Table 1 we combined the Millennial young adults, the GenX 
young adults and the GenX middle adults into one group. We also combined the Baby Boom 
middle and senior adults into one group. Appendix C below presents results for the five separate 
generation–life-cycle stage groups. Therefore in Appendix C, 1973 young adults are discussed 
separately from 1973 middle adults. Because the young adult 25-31 year-olds in 1973 were a 
combination of people born in the first three years of the Baby Boom (1946-1948) and the last 
four years of the Silent generation (1942-1945), we will refer to this generational mix as 
“Silent/Boom”. 
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B.2 The analysis samples 
 The analysis samples from the National Study and the Panel Study follow Wilhelm et al. 
(2007). Within each of the National Study and the Panel Study there are separate subsamples. In 
the National Study there are two subsamples: one collected by the University of Michigan’s 
Survey Research Center (SRC) and the other collected by the Census Bureau. The SRC used an 
area probability design that achieved a high-income oversample by oversampling people older 
than 25 or who had a college education. Of the two National Study sub-samples, the SRC sample 
is most comparable to the Panel Study’s nationally-representative sub-sample, which is also 
collected by the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center and is also referred to as the 
“SRC” sample. Our analysis uses the National Study’s SRC subsample and the Panel Study’s 
SRC subsample.1,2,3 
                                                 
1Although the National Study’s SRC sample oversampled high-income people, the Census Bureau’s 
high-income oversample was based directly on incomes reported to the IRS and consequently obtained a 
“better” high-income oversample than did the SRC. The Census sample was collected to achieve design 
goals of the National Study (e.g., construct a measure of aggregate giving in the U.S. and the share of that 
giving done by different income groups) but is not usable for comparison with subsequent surveys that do 
not also contained a similarly constructed high-income oversample. Among subsequent American 
surveys, only the Panel Study comes anywhere close to matching the Census sample’s measurement of 
the top of the giving distribution: the Panel Study matches the National Study’s measurement of giving 
(Census + SRC sample combined) through the 92nd percentile (Wilhelm, 2007). Setting aside the Census 
sample, the Panel Study matches the National Study’s SRC sample higher into the distribution, to the 98th 
percentile (Wilhelm et al., 2007). We follow Wilhelm et al. (2007) and use the National Study’s SRC 
sample, with the qualification that our findings apply to generational succession among “typical” 
American families. Generational succession among families in the top two percent of the giving 
distribution is a topic for future research. 
2In addition to its SRC nationally-representative sample, the Panel Study also contains a low-income 
oversample (see next footnote) and a 1997 immigrant refresher sample. We do not use these two samples 
in order to maintain better comparability with the National Study’s SRC sample. 
3Historical note: James Morgan, Principal Investigator of the National Study, was also the founding 
Principal Investigator of the PSID in 1968. Morgan originated the idea to collect the nationally-
representative SRC subsample as part of the PSID, in addition to the low-income oversample that the 
federal government’s Office of Economic Opportunity approached him to collect (Duncan, 1999). 
Morgan led the PSID into the 1980s. In the late 1990s Morgan contributed his expert advice based on his 
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 Previous work indicates that the Panel Study provides a reasonably representative 
measurement of important aggregates such as income, wealth and giving. For example 
Gouskova, Andreski, & Schoeni (2010) find that the Panel Study measures a slightly higher level 
of income than does the Current Population Survey, but that measurement of income trends 
matches CPS income trends closely, except at the very top and bottom of the income 
distribution. Likewise, Pfeffer, Schoeni, Kennickell, & Andreski (2015) find that the Panel Study 
measurement of total net worth is similar to that of the Survey of Consumer Finances, again 
except at the top two percent of the wealth distribution; see Juster, Smith, and Stafford (1999) for 
a similar result. Again likewise, Wilhelm (2006) finds that the Panel Study distribution of giving 
matches the distribution of IRS charitable deductions fairly closely, except at the very top of the 
distribution. 
 Because age is a central variable in the present paper Table B1 checks to make sure that 
the age distributions in the Panel Study and in the National Study match the age distributions 
from the Current Population Survey. Column 1 presents the distribution of adults ages 25-59 in 
2012 from the CPS. Column 2 shows that that is matched by the age distribution from the 2012 
wave of the Panel Study fairly well: a slightly smaller fraction of the Panel Study’s adults are in 
the youngest category (25-29), a slightly larger fraction are in the oldest category (55-59), and 
virtually identical fractions are in the middle categories. Column 3 presents the 1972 age 
distribution from the CPS, and column 4 shows that the National Study’s age distribution is 
virtually identical. 
  
                                                 
design of the PSID, the National Study of Philanthropy, and numerous other high-quality surveys to the 
team designing the Philanthropy Panel Study, the PSID’s philanthropy module. 
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Table B1. Age distributions in the Panel and National Studies compared to the CPS. 
 
Age range CPS Panel Study CPS National Study 
 2012 2012 1972 1973 
25 - 29 .144 .126 .295 .304 30 - 34 .140 .140 
35 - 39 .131 .130 .245 .243 40 - 44 .143 .146 
45 - 49 .148 .147 .254 .249 50 - 54 .154 .152 
55 - 59 .141 .159 .206 .205 60 - 64    –    – 
Notes. Column 1 is from the U.S. Census Bureau (2013). Column 3 is from the U.S. Census Bureau (1974). 
Columns 1 and 2 are conditional on the set of adults in the 25-59 age range; columns 3 and 4 are condition on the set 
of adults ages 25-64. 
 
 
 
B.3 Measuring giving 
As described in the text, the National Study interview had a skip pattern that has two 
implications for our analysis. Figure B1 below is a flow chart that describes the skip pattern. 
After the initial screening question (“Did you give . . .”) respondents who donated were asked if 
they had given more than $100 in total to “religious or other charitable organizations”. Only if 
they said “yes” were they asked about the total amount they gave, and the separate types of 
organizations to which they gave. Following Wilhelm et al. (2007) we use the amounts given to 
religious organizations reported in response to these questions to measure 1973 giving to 
“congregations”. Giving to charitable organizations is then the total amount of all giving minus 
the amounts given to congregations just described. 
As a minor note, although the survey question was framed in terms of having given more 
than $100, 35 people reported giving exactly $100 and were asked all of the subsequent detailed 
questions about giving. We include these 35 respondents in our analysis. 
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Figure B1. Flow chart of the National Study of Philanthropy’s opening questions about giving.  
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The $100 screening question implies that for respondents who gave something to a 
charitable organization or congregation, but whose total amount given was less than $100, all 
that is known is that they gave something in the interval $1-to-$100 in 1973 dollars. Continuing 
with the example of 36-60 year-olds in 1973 from the text, this would be $6.16-to-$616 in 
inflation/real income growth adjusted 2012 dollars. For the National Study respondents in this 
interval we set their giving to the lower bound ($6.16 in 2012 terms), and artificially impose this 
same lack of information on the Panel Study respondents who gave in the interval $6.16-to-$616 
by setting their giving to the lower bound. Again, this follows Wilhelm et al. (2007). 
 Finally, a reader pointed out that it may be the case that the high screen of $100 resulted 
in an underestimate of donors of large amounts in the National Study. To the extent that it did, 
the percentages of donors of large amounts in 1973 are too small, and the generation-to-
generation drop in that percentage that we report also too small. 
 
B.4 Methods 
B.4.1 Adjustments to 2012 terms 
The general idea of adjusting the National Study’s amounts given from 1973 dollars to 
2012 terms was explained in the text: adjust the 1973 amounts forward to account for both real 
income growth and inflation. We continue with the example from the text: the giving of 36-60 
year olds in 1973, is adjusted to 2012 by a factor and inflation real growth factor of 6.16. The 
6.16 describes inflation/real growth for people ages 35 to 64, the closest age grouping to 36-60 
for which income growth rates can be calculated from national statistics (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 2015).  
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The inflation adjustment needs no explanation. As for the real income adjustment: if 36-
60 year-olds gave $150 on average in 1973, and had there been no inflation between 1973 and 
2012 (for the sake of argument) but the incomes of people aged 36-60 had increased by 50% 
over that time period and at the same time the average giving of 36-60 year-olds had also 
increased by 50% to $225, we would say that giving of 36-60 year olds had increased in line 
with expectations based on what 36-60 year-olds were giving in 1973. In this sense, those 
expectations, and our results, are about generational succession in giving as a percentage of 
income available to each generation, even though (as we say in the text) we present the results in 
dollar terms to ease discussion.  
We carried out the inflation/real growth adjustment in two steps: (1) adjust 1973 amounts 
forward to a middle year among the 2000-2012 Panel Study years (e.g., 2006) using age-specific 
nominal income growth rates from national statistics (nominal income growth rates capture both 
real income growth and inflation) and then (2) inflation-adjust between the middle year and 2012 
using the Consumer Price Index. 
 Table B2 describes the adjustments for the two age groups—25-47 year-olds and 36-60 
year-olds—used in Panel 1 of both Tables 1 and 2. For example, row 2 shows that the giving of 
36-60 year-olds in 1973 was first adjusted to 2006 by a factor of 5.40. The 5.40 is the weighted 
average growth rate of nominal household income for 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64 year-olds (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 2015). Then the amounts are inflation-adjusted from 2006 to 2012 by a 
factor of 1.14, the CPI inflation rate (U.S. Department of Labor, 2016). The total adjustment is 
5.40 * 1.14 = 6.16. The corresponding 5.90 total adjustment for 25-47 year-olds in row 1 is 
based on the slightly lower 5.18 weighted average growth rate of nominal household income for 
25-34 and 35-44 year-olds. 
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We adjust the Panel Study data similarly: (1) adjust 2000-2004 and 2008-2012 amounts 
to the middle year (e.g., 2006), but for the Panel Study we use its own income data and then (2) 
inflation-adjust between the middle year and 2012 using the CPI. We use the Panel Study’s own 
income data because, as noted above, measurement of changes in income in the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) is comparable to that in the Census Bureau’s Current Population 
Survey (Gouskova, Andreski, & Schoeni, 2010). Table B3 repeats the total adjustments (from 
Table B2) for the National Study in column 2, and then the total adjustments for each of the 
Panel Study years in columns 3-9. Because the middle year is 2006, the 2006 adjustment (1.14) 
is just the CPI inflation rate from 2006 to 2012. 
In Appendix C below there are five separate generation–life-cycle groups: Millennial 
young adults (ages 25-31), GenX young adults (ages 25-31), GenX middle adults (ages 32-47), 
Baby Boom middle adults (ages 36-47), and Baby Boom senior adults (ages 48-60). The 
amounts given by each of these age groups are adjusted to 2012 terms in the manner just 
described. However, because the age ranges in the five separate group are different from the 25-
47 and 36-60 ranges in Tables B2 and B3 different adjustments are needed. Table B4 presents 
the adjustments for the 1973 data, and Table B5 presents the adjustments for the Panel Study 
years. Starting with the Panel Study and Table B5, rows 4-7 indicate that Millennial young adults 
appear in the Panel Study in 2006-2012; for them the middle year for adjustment is 2010 (in 
column 3 the income adjustment is 1.00 because no adjustment is needed for the middle year; the 
inflation adjustment to 2012 is 1.05 in column 4 and therefore the total adjustment to 2012 is 
1.05 in column 5). In line with this, the first row in Table B4 shows the adjustment of the 1973 
amounts given by 25-31 year-olds from 1973 to 2010, the middle year for Millennial young 
adults. Table B4 Row 2 adjusts the 1973 amounts given by 25-31 year-olds from 1973 to 2006, 
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the middle year for GenX young adults. For the other groups—GenX middle adults, Baby Boom 
middle adults and Baby Boom senior adults—the middle year is 2006. 
Panel 2 in the text (for both Tables 1 and 2) presents near-term generation-to-generation 
comparisons: Millennial young adults compared to GenX young adults and GenX middle adults 
compared to Baby Boom middle adults. To compare Millennial young adults to GenX young 
adults, the “middle year” (to which amounts given are adjusted by nominal income growth rates) 
must be the same for both groups, and the average income in each calendar year among 25-31 
year-olds used to calculate nominal income growth rates should be the same for both the 
Millennials and GenX. Neither of these requirements are satisfied by the adjustments in Table 
B5; Table B5 used different middle years for the Millennial (2010) and GenX (2006), and used 
different average incomes (according to whether the young adults were Millennials or GenX) to 
form the nominal income growth rates. Therefore the Table B5 adjustments cannot be used for 
the near-term generation-to-generation comparisons in the Panel 2s. 
For the Panel 2s we adjust amounts given by GenX middle adults to 2010, the same 
middle year used for Millennial young adults, and use nominal incomes for 25-31 years-olds in 
each calendar year to calculate the nominal income growth rates.  For the Panel 2s’ GenX 
comparison to Baby Boomers when both were in their middle adulthood years, we use nominal 
incomes for 36-47 years-olds in each calendar year to calculate the nominal income growth rates. 
Table B6 shows the adjustments used to produce the Panel 2s. 
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 Notes: The income growth rates in column 2 were based on the change in nominal household income within age-
specific categories. Nominal household income for 1973 and 2006 is from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2015) which 
reports average incomes for the age ranges 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64. For row 1 column 2 we form a weighted 
average for the 25-34 and 35-44 groups in both 1973 and 2006 and from these calculate the growth rate in nominal 
income. For row 2 we do the same using the 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64 groups. The CPI inflation rate in column 3 is 
from U.S. Department of Labor (2016). The total adjustment in column 4 is column 2 times column 3. 
 
 
 
 
Table B3. Adjusting 2000-2004 and 2008-2012 amounts given to 2012 terms in Panel 1 of both 
Tables 1 and 2. 
Age group 
1974 National Study 
of Philanthropy  
Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
25-47 5.90 1.28 1.26 1.14 1.14 1.11 1.18 1.15 
36-60 6.16 1.27 1.33 1.18 1.14 1.09 1.15 1.07 
Notes: Columns 3-9 are the total adjustments for the Panel Study data from the indicated year to 2012. Average 
income for age-specific groups is calculated from the PSID. The CPI inflation rate is from U.S. Department of Labor 
(2016). 
 
 
 
 Notes: See the notes to Table B2. Average household income used to calculate the growth rate in nominal income in 
column 2 is for 25-34 year olds in rows 1 and 2, 35-44 year-olds in row 3 and 45-64 year olds in row 4. In column 3, 
the CPI-based inflation rate from 2010 to 2012 is 1.05, and from 2006 to 2012 is 1.14. 
a The middle year is 2010 for the adjustment used to form comparisons with Millennial young adults. 
b The middle year is 2006 for the adjustment used to form comparisons with GenX young adults. 
c The middle year is 2006 for the adjustments used to form comparisons with GenX middle adults and Baby Boom 
middle adults. 
d The middle year is 2006 for the adjustment used to form comparisons with Baby Boom senior adults. 
Table B2. Adjusting 1973 amounts given to 2012 terms in Panel 1 of both Tables 1 and 2.   
Age group 
Income growth rate from  
1973 to 2006 ab 
Inflation adjustment from 
2006 to 2012 c Total 
25-47 5.18 1.14 5.90 
36-60 5.40 1.14 6.16 
Table B4.  Adjusting 1973 amounts given to 2012 terms in Appendix C’s Figures 1, 3, 4 
and 6.   
Age group  
Income growth rate from 1973 to 
2006/2010 ab 
Inflation adjustment from 
2006/2010 to 2012 Total 
25-31a 4.89 1.05 5.13 
25-31b 4.96 1.14 5.66 
32-47c 5.17 1.14 5.89 
48-60d 5.53 1.14 6.30 
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Note: See the notes to Table B3. 
Table B5.  Adjusting Panel Study amounts given to 2012 terms in Appendix C’s Figures 1, 3, 4 and 6. 
Generation– 
life-cycle  
Calendar 
Year 
Income growth rate  from 
calendar year to 2006/2010 
Inflation adjustment 
from 2006/2010 to 2012 Total 
Millennial  2000 — — — 
young adults 2002 — — — 
(ages 25-31) 2004 — — — 
 2006 1.09 1.05 1.15 
 2008 1.02 1.05 1.07 
 2010 1.00 1.05 1.05 
 2012 0.91 1.05 0.96 
     
GenX  2000 1.13 1.14 1.29 
young adults 2002 1.10 1.14 1.26 
(ages 25-31) 2004 1.10 1.14 1.25 
 2006 1.00 1.14 1.14 
 2008 0.91 1.14 1.04 
 2010 0.90 1.14 1.02 
 2012  —  —  —      
GenX  2000  1.21 1.14 1.38 
middle adults 2002 1.15 1.14 1.32 
(ages 32-47) 2004 1.07 1.14 1.22 
 2006 1.00 1.14 1.14 
 2008 0.91 1.14 1.04 
 2010 0.96 1.14 1.09 
 2012 0.92 1.14 1.04 
     
Baby Boom 2000 1.20 1.14 1.37 
middle adults 2002 1.18 1.14 1.34 
(ages 36-47) 2004 0.98 1.14 1.12 
 2006 1.00 1.14 1.14 
 2008 0.98 1.14 1.11 
 2010 1.02 1.14 1.16 
 2012  —  —  — 
     
Baby boom 2000 1.03 1.14 1.17 
senior adults 2002 1.15 1.14 1.31 
(ages 48-60) 2004 1.06 1.14 1.21 
 2006 1.00 1.14 1.14 
 2008 0.96 1.14 1.09 
 2010 1.02 1.14 1.16 
 2012 0.94 1.14 1.07 
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Notes: a The middle year is 2010 for the adjustment used to form comparisons with Millennial and GenX young 
adults. 
b The middle year is 2006 for the adjustment used to form comparisons with GenX and Boomer middle adults. 
c It is a coincidence that the adjustment for this year is 1.00; the middle year for 36-47 year-olds is 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.4.2 Extensions relative to Wilhelm et al. (2007) 
 For the first two extensions in the paper relative to Wilhelm et al. (2007)—(1) results 
about the percentages in each generation who give large amounts and the average amount given 
by these “large amount donors” and (2) near-term generation-to generation comparisons—there 
is a subtlety. For the first extension, a person who (a) gave more than $100 to charitable 
organizations and religious congregations combined and (b) gave something to charitable 
organizations, did not necessarily give more than $100 to just the charitable organizations. For 
example, among the group of Greatest/Silent generation ages 36-60 in 1973, 51% did (a) and 
Table B6.  Adjusting Panel Study amounts given to 2012 terms in Panel 2 of both Tables 1 and 2. 
Age group  
Calendar 
Year 
Income growth rate  from 
calendar year to 2006/2010 
Inflation adjustment 
from 2006/2010 to 2012 Total 
25-31a 2000 1.01 1.05 1.07 
 2002 0.99 1.05 1.04 
 2004 0.98 1.05 1.03 
 2006 0.94 1.05 0.99 
 2008 0.94 1.05 0.99 
 2010 1.00 1.05 1.05 
 2012 0.98 1.05 1.03 
     
36-47b 2000 1.15 1.14 1.31 
 2002 1.14 1.14 1.30 
 2004 1.00 1.14 1.13 
 2006 1.00 1.14 1.14 
 2008 0.96 1.14 1.09 
 2010 1.00
c 1.14 1.14 
 2012  0.95 1.14  1.09      
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(b)—see Table 1 Panel 1, row 2 column 4—but among that 51%, 42% gave (more than zero but) 
$100 or less to charitable organizations. Although the language is somewhat strained, we are 
careful in the text to say “the percentage who gave to charitable organizations (and who gave 
large amounts to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined)” with the 
maintained understanding that the charitable organizations were not always the recipients of the 
large amounts ($100 or more). Likewise, we say “the percentage who gave large amounts (and 
who gave large amounts)” with the maintained understanding that congregations were not always 
the recipients of the large amounts. 
 The second extension—near-term generation-to generation comparison—requires data 
from the Panel Study only. Nevertheless, a similar subtlety arises: in the Panel Study’s 
questionnaire, amounts given (and the split between amounts given to charitable organizations 
and congregations) were asked only of respondents who gave more than $25 (in terms of dollars 
in the 2000s) to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined. Because the $25 
threshold is a fairly small amount, for the near-term generation-to generation comparisons we 
ease the language in the text, making statements like “the percentage of Millennial young adults 
who give to charitable organizations is 12 points lower than the percentage of GenX young 
adults who did so”. This really means: the percentage who (a) gave more than $25 to charitable 
organizations and religious congregations combined and (b) gave something to charitable 
organizations is 12 points lower. We think the $25 threshold is small enough that it need not be 
kept in mind when interpreting the results in the same way that the higher $100 National Study 
threshold should be kept in mind. 
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B.4.3 Influential observations 
The possibility that a very small number of influential observations can dramatically alter 
an estimate of average giving is more of a problem for us than it was for Wilhelm et al. (2007), 
and therefore we take a different approach. Wilhelm et al. (2007) used only middle adulthood 
respondents from the National Study, ages 35-49; N = 574. They decided that none of these 
observations were influential. We are using three stages of adulthood across ages 25-60; N = 
1,469. By using two and a half times more observations from a study that has a high income 
oversample there are simply more possibilities for us to encounter influential observations, and 
we did. 
 We define a National Study giving amount to be potentially influential if it noticeably 
stands apart from the rest of the distribution of giving. Visual inspection of the data reveals only 
six observations, each giving more than $50,000 (in 2012 terms), that clearly stand apart. 
Applying this definition to the Panel Study yields 25 observations with amounts given larger 
than $50,000, but including them or excluding them makes negligible difference to the estimated 
Panel Study averages. 
In the text’s Panel 1 (for both Tables 1 and 2) we did not include the National Study’s 
influential observation in estimating 1973 averages, but did include the Panel Study’s influential 
observations in estimating averages from the 2000s (see the notes to Tables 1 and 2). This has 
the effect of making the 1973 estimated averages somewhat smaller and the 2000s estimated 
averages somewhat larger, yielding more conservative results about lower-than-expected average 
giving among the Millennial, GenX and Baby Boom generations. 
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In Appendix C, which contains the results for five separate generation–life-cycle groups, 
we present two 1973 estimates for each comparison: one that includes the National Study’s 
influential observations and one that does not. The Panel Study estimated averages in Appendix 
C include the influential observations, just as in the main text’s Panel 1s. The six influential 
observations in the National Study are: (a) Silent/Boom young adults: one for giving to 
congregations; (b) Silent middle adults: one for giving to charitable organizations; (c) Greatest 
senior adults: three for giving to congregations and one for giving to charitable organizations.  
 
B.4.4 Clustering and weights in the Panel Study 
 The third extension relative to Wilhelm et al. (2007) is pooling seven waves from the 
PSID together to generate more precise estimates. Because the same persons can, and do, appear 
multiple times in the pooled cross-section Panel Study data we adjust the standard errors for 
clustering. The clustering is done at two levels: individual and couple (see Cameron & Miller, 
2013). The need for two-level clustering arises from the family-based unit of analysis in the 
Panel Study and family composition change over time. In a single wave (e.g., 2000) of the Panel 
Study, the unit of analysis for charitable giving is the “family unit”. For single people, the family 
unit is headed by a man or a woman (obviously). For couples (legally married or cohabiting) the 
family unit is headed by a man and a woman.  
For couples, married and cohabiting, the unit of analysis at which giving is measured in 
the Panel Study is that of the couple, just as the unit of analysis at which income, wealth and 
consumption expenditure are measured in each wave is also the couple.4 However, when using 
                                                 
4 The family unit of analysis for giving in the PSID is no different than it is for income, wealth, and consumption 
expenditure. Strictly speaking the family unit also includes other people living in the household who share economic 
resources with the head, such as children, but it is standard practice to think of the family-level income, wealth, 
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data from multiple waves, the couple can no longer serve as the unit of analysis because not all 
couples remain together over time: some break up and others newly form. The only unit of 
analysis that is stable over time is the individual. To handle the complication that giving is 
measured at the unit of the couple but that individuals, not couples, are the stable units of 
analysis over time, for each observation of a couple we create two individual-level observations, 
one for the man and another for the woman. For each of these two observations, we assign a 
weight equal to one-half the “couple-level” weight that couple had in the PSID; this ensures that 
averaged calculated with the weighted individual-level observations are identical to the weighted 
averages with the couple-level observations.5 
  
                                                 
consumption expenditure and giving as reflecting the behavior and decisions of primarily the person or couple at the 
head. 
5 An additional advantage of this approach is that if the man and the woman in a couple belong to different 
generations or life-cycle stages, we can assign the man to his appropriate generation/life-cycle stage and the woman 
to her’s, and avoid having to assign the couple as a unit to either the man’s generation/life-cycle stage or the 
woman’s generation/life-cycle stage. 
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Appendix C. Results for five generation–life-cycle groups. 
 
In the text’s Panel 1 for both Tables 1 and 2 we presented results for two recent 
generational groups: (1) Millennial young adults, GenX young adults and GenX middle adults, 
and (2) Baby Boom middle and senior adults. In this appendix we present results for the five 
separate generation–life-cycle groups described in Appendix A: Millennial young adults (ages 
25-31), GenX young adults (ages 25-31), GenX middle adults (ages 32-47), Baby Boom middle 
adults (ages 36-47), and Baby Boom senior adults (ages 48-60). The age ranges in parentheses 
are the age ranges used with the National Study to form the 1973 comparison groups. As for 
middle adults, note that when comparing GenX middle adults to 1973 middle adults we use 32-
47 year-olds in 1973, but when we compare Baby Boom middle adults to 1973 middle adults we 
use the slightly narrower age range of 36-47 year-olds in 1973—the slightly narrower age range 
matches the availability of Baby Boom middle adults in calendar years 2000-2010 (see Appendix 
A). 
The age ranges for the five separate groups are obviously narrower than the two age 
ranges used in the Panel 1s, and accordingly this implies smaller sample sizes. The smaller 
sample sizes are most notable in the National Study (Ns = 388, 618 and 463) for the three age 
ranges in 1973, leading to larger standard errors on the 1973 estimated averages. Therefore, for 
the results describing the five generation–life-cycle groups in this appendix we follow Wilhelm 
et al. (2007) and base our interpretation of these results not on the statistical significance of any 
one generation-to-generation difference, but rather on the overall pattern of the differences. 
Recall our main purpose here is a sensitivity check to see if any of the results based on the five 
groups suggest a qualification to the Panel 1 results for (1) Millennial/GenX–young/middle 
adults and (2) Baby Boom–middle/senior adults. And recall that the one instance where a 
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qualification is suggested is in the giving to congregations by Millennial young adults and GenX 
young adults. 
We also describe the effects of the National Study’s influential observations on the 
estimates. Recall that to achieve a more conservative interpretation of generation-to-generation 
change, the National Study estimates in the Panel 1s do not include influential observations, but 
the Panel Study estimates do. 
 
C.1 Charitable organizations 
Figures 1-3 present generation-to-generation comparisons about giving to charitable 
organizations. Figure 1 presents estimates of average amounts given, averaging across both 
donors and non-donors. The left most bar indicates that the estimate of average giving among 
Millennial young adults is $157 (the height of the bar), one-half of the amount that would have 
been expected based on the $315 estimated average giving of Silent/Boom young adults in 1973 
(the asterisk above the bar). The 95% confidence interval around the $157 is displayed in the 
figure. The next bar to the right indicates that at $298, average giving among GenX young adults 
is not much less (about $50) less than the $347 that would have been expected based on the 
Silent/Boom young adults; the $347 is right on the edge of the Panel Study 95% confidence 
interval. Moving to the middle bar there is stronger evidence that GenX middle adults are giving 
a lower amount, on average, than did Silent generation middle adults: $551 compared to $770. 
The $770 estimate does not include one National Study influential observation, but including this 
observation raises the Silent generation estimated average only slightly (the “+” marker in Figure 
1). Table Panel 1, row 1 column 2 in the text combined into one group the sample described in 
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these left most three bars from Figure 1—Millennial young adults with GenX young and middle 
adults—and estimated their average giving to be $443. 
The next bar (fourth from the left) indicates that Baby Boom middle adults are giving in 
line with expectations based on the average giving of the Silent generation: $751 compared to 
$758. The last bar indicates that Baby Boom senior adults are giving $974, on average, to 
charitable organizations. This is not much less ($104) than the $1,078 estimate of average giving 
of Greatest generation senior adults in 1973 if one influential observation is excluded. If the 
observation is included the Greatest generation average is just a little higher. Table 2 row 1 
column 5 combined Baby Boom middle and senior adults into one group and estimated their 
average giving to be $880. 
Our overall read of Figure 1 is the same as Table Panel 1, row 1: there is evidence that 
Millennial young adults and GenX young middle adults are giving, on average, amounts lower 
than would have been expected, but not so among the Baby Boom.  
Figure 2 indicates that the “donors down” pattern seen in Table 1 Panel 1, row 2, that 
described lower percentages who give something to charitable organizations (and who give large 
amounts), applies to each of the five generation–life-cycle stage groups. The largest percentage 
point difference is 20 points between GenX middle adults (32%) and Silent generation middle 
adults (52%). The smallest percentage point difference is five points between Baby Boom senior 
adults (46%) and Greatest generation senior adults (51%). All of the differences in Figure 2 are 
statistically significant (p < .05).  
Figure 3 presents estimates of average amounts given to charitable organizations, 
however averaging only across the donors represented by the percentages in Figure 2. In each 
comparison the estimates indicate that donors from the 2000s are either (a) giving amounts not 
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much lower, on average, than their 1973 comparison generation (Millennial young adults and 
Baby Boom senior adults), or giving higher amounts on average than would have been expected 
(GenX young and middle adults and Baby Boom middle adults).  
 In summary the evidence from Figures 1-3 matches that in Table 1 Panel 1. The average 
amounts given to charitable organizations are lower among Millennial young adults and GenX 
young and middle adults than would have been expected based on previous generations. In 
contrast, average amounts given by the Baby Boom appear to be in line with expectations. This 
mixed picture emerges from two unambiguous patterns: the percentages who give to charitable 
organizations (and who give large amounts) are down (Figure 2), but the average amounts given 
by such donors are in line with expectations or perhaps higher than expectations. Again, our 
interpretation: the number (percentage) of donors down, dollars per donor up. 
 Note that Figures 1-3 contain estimates close to, but not exactly equal to, those used in 
Table 1 Panel 2’s “near-term” generation-to generation comparisons of giving to charitable 
organizations.  For example, the two left-most bars in Figure 1 indicate the estimates of average 
giving (a) among Millennial young adults ($157) and (b) among GenX in young adults ($298) 
and these are nearly identical, but not exactly equal, to the $159 and $250 presented in Table 3 
row 1 columns 2 and 1 respectively. The small difference between the estimates is because, as 
explained at the end of Appendix B, different nominal income growth rates were necessary to 
adjust amounts given to 2012 terms according to the two different comparisons: generations in 
the 2000s compared to generations in 1973 (Panel 1 in both Tables 1 and 2, and in Figures 1-6) 
and generations in the 2000s compared to each other (Panel 2 in both Tables 1 and 2). 
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C.2 Congregations 
Figure 4 presents results about average giving to congregations. Starting with the Baby 
Boom middle and senior adults (the right-most two bars), average giving to congregations at 
$1,095 and $1,398 is less than expected compared to the Silent and Greatest generations in 1973. 
This result holds whether or not influential observations are included in the 1973 estimates, and 
echoes Table 2 Panel 1, row 1 columns 4-6. 
Giving to congregations by Millennial young adults and GenX young and middle adults 
(the three left-most bars) is certainly less than expected compared to Silent/Boom young adults 
in 1973 if the influential observations are included in the 1973 estimates. If the one influential 
observation among the 1973 Silent generation young adults is not included, the 1973 estimate for 
25-31 year olds to be compared to Millennial young adults falls to $493 (and is right on the edge 
of the Millennial young adults’ 95% confidence interval) and the estimate to be compared to 
GenX young adults falls to $544 (and is in the middle of the GenX young adult confidence 
interval). Hence, the qualifying nuance discussed in the text: the Millennial/GenX –
young/middle adults less than expected giving to congregations (by −$412; Table 2 row 4 
column 3) is that it may apply with less force to Millennial young adults (although even setting 
the 1973 influential observation aside, the 1973 estimate of $493 is still on the edge of the 
Millennial confidence interval) and to GenX young adults. 
Despite this qualification, Figure 4’s average giving to congregations emerges from the 
two unambiguous patterns seen before: the percentages who give large amounts and who give to 
congregations are down (Figure 5) in each of the five comparisons, but the average amounts 
given by those who give to congregations (and who give large amounts) for the most part is in 
line with expectations or perhaps higher than expectations (Figure 6). We say for the “most part” 
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because giving to congregations by GenX young adult donors (and Baby Boom senior adults) 
appears higher than (or for the Baby Boom senior adults, in line with) expectations only if one 
(three) influential observations are excluded from the 1973 averages. 
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Figure 1 Charitable organization: Average giving by all families.
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C.3 Sensitivity checks 
C.3.1 Influential observations 
We have examined the robustness of the results to the inclusion or exclusion of 
influential observations from the National Study samples, and in Sections C.1 and C.2 have 
already noted any sensitivity of the results when it occurred.  Recall that potentially influential 
observations in the Panel Study are always included; this reduces differences between the 
National Study averages and the Panel Study averages when the former are higher than the latter, 
and leads to more conservative conclusions in Table 1 and 2’s Panel 1 row 1. We checked the 
results about donors of large amounts in Table 1 and 2’s Panel 1 row 3 and in Figures 3 and 6, 
where in several comparisons Panel Study averages were higher than National Study averages, 
by excluding the Panel Study influential observations: this did not qualitatively change the 
comparisons. 
 
C.3.2 The Great Recession and the recovery years 
We also checked the robustness of the results to dropping the years of the Great 
Recession and the post-recession recovery for the two comparisons involving GenX middle 
adults and Baby Boom senior adults, two groups for which a non-negligible fraction of their 
observations came from the years of the Great Recession and recovery (62 and 48 percent, 
respectively). Table C1 reports estimates of average giving for GenX middle adults and Baby 
Boom senior adults using just the pre-Recession years 2000-2006. The table indicates that 
dropping the years of the Great Recession and the recovery to focus on the pre-Recession years 
makes little difference in the estimates. The estimate of average giving to charitable 
organizations by GenX middle adults drops to $522 when only the pre-recession years are used; 
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this estimate is a little lower (somewhat surprisingly) than the $551 in Figure 1 because by 
focusing on the pre-recession years, we are necessarily focusing on the youngest of the GenX 
middle adults (all GenX people aged 42-47 are necessarily dropped). In addition, the average 
giving in the recession years is driven by large donors. If we exclude from the average three 
observations who gave above $25,000, the average giving in recession years ($518) is nearly 
identical to the pre-recession years ($522).  The estimate of average giving to congregations by 
GenX middle adults also is a little lower when only the pre-recession years are used: $644 
compared to $673. Overall, the changes in estimates seen by dropping the recession years are 
small and do not qualitatively alter the comparison of GenX middle adults to Silent generation 
middle adults. 
Similarly, the comparison of Baby Boom senior adults to Greatest generation senior 
adults is not altered by dropping the recession years. The estimates of Baby Boom senior adult 
average giving to charitable organizations and congregations do increase (by $30 from $974 to 
$1,004 for charitable organizations and by $61 from $1,398 to $1,459 for congregations), but the 
increases are small.  
Among Millennial young adults it is also the case that a non-negligible fraction of the 
observations (94 percent) came from the years of the Great Recession and the recovery. 
Unfortunately, there are not enough pre-recession observations for Millennial young adults to 
form a meaningful estimate that excludes the Great Recession/recovery years: 2006 is the only 
such year and in 2006 the oldest Millennials were 25-years old (N = 207). Hence the limitation to 
interpreting the results about Millennial young adults pointed out in the text’s Discussion section. 
For GenX young adults and Baby Boom middle adults the fractions of observations from  
the years of the Great Recession and the recovery are low to begin with: 21 and 13 percent.  
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Table C1. Average giving by all families: Pre-recession years 2000-2006. 
 
Notes: The estimates in the “all years” columns are from Figures 1 (charitable organizations) and 4 (congregations). 
The sample sizes are N = 4,620 (GenX) and N = 6,741 (Baby Boom). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
C.3.3 Alternative measurement of giving to congregations 
 We checked the robustness of the results to the measurement of giving to congregations 
in the National Study, which recall was based on whether a congregation was among the four 
organizations to which a respondent gave their four largest gifts. This measurement may slightly 
understate giving to congregations. To the extent that it does, then our measure of giving to 
charitable organizations in 1973, measured as all giving minus giving to congregations, will be 
slightly overstated. Therefore we checked the robustness of the results to using an alternative 
measurement of giving to congregations based on a question that immediately followed the 
question about total giving to all organizations: “About how much of that total, or what percent, 
went to a church or religious organization?” The alternative measurement suggests only a 
slightly higher amount going to congregations, and accordingly leads to essentially no change in 
our results.  
                 GenX  
       Middle adulthood 
             Baby Boom 
        Senior adulthood 
 All years Pre-recession  All years Pre-recession 
Charitable organizations 551 
(43) 
522 
(28) 
 974 
(63) 
1004 
(56) 
      
Congregations 673 
(48) 
644 
(38) 
 1398 
(86) 
1459 
(75) 
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C.4 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
 Table B2 presents results decomposing the generation-to-generation change in average 
giving from Figures 1 and 4 into a part due to generation-to-generation change in income and 
wealth and a part due to generation-to-generation change in how much is given at each level of 
income and wealth—a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Jann, 2008). We carried out the 
decompositions for generation-to-generation comparisons that did not include the influential 
observations in the 1973 averages. 
For GenX (young and middle adults) and the Baby Boom (middle and senior adults) the 
results indicate that increases in income and wealth, compared to the income and wealth held by 
their Silent and Greatest generation comparison groups at the same life-cycle stages, offset what 
otherwise would have been even lower levels of giving. For example, the negligible $7 less-than-
expected giving to charitable organizations by Baby Boom middle adults (Figure 1: $751 − $758 
= − $7) would have been − $221 (less-than-expected) had it not been for +$214 higher giving 
attributable to increases in Baby Boom middle adults’ income and wealth (compared to the 
income and wealth of the Silent generation when they were in middle adulthood). Hence, 
inferring “no change” in generation-to-generation giving from the negligible − $7 is not exactly 
correct: there have been two large changes, but in offsetting directions.  
Similar results obtain for GenX, except that increases in income in wealth offset a smaller 
amount of the less-than-expected giving that otherwise would have appeared. For example, for 
GenX middle adults the $219 less-than-expected giving (Figure 1: $551 − $770 = − $219), 
would have been − $269 had it not been for +$50 higher giving attributable to increases in 
income and wealth (note: smaller than the Baby Boom’s +$214).  
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 The one exception to this pattern is among Millennial young adults. For them the $158 
less-than-expected giving (Figure 1: $157 − $315 = − $158) is decomposed into − $147 that 
would have been had there been no change in income and wealth and −$11 attributable to lower 
income and wealth (again, compared to the Silent generation in their young adulthood years). 
The −$11 is a negligible amount, but it does indicate that for Millennial young adults, income 
and wealth are not offsetting less-than-expected giving. This may be an indication that, as 
suggested above, that the results for the Millennials may have been inordinately influenced by 
their giving being measured primarily during the Great Recession and recovery years. 
Results for giving to congregations are similar, except that in most cases the higher 
giving due to income and wealth (e.g., +$143 and +12 for Baby Boom and GenX middle adults, 
respectively), though similar in size to the higher giving to charitable organizations due to 
income and wealth (e.g., +$214 and +50, respectively, as just discussed), does less offsetting of 
the much lower giving that otherwise would have appeared. Exceptions are GenX young adults 
(for whom the offsetting is nearly complete, leading to the negligible $8 less-than-expected 
giving seen in Figure 4) and Millennial young adults who experienced decreases in income and 
wealth that explain a portion of their less-than-expected giving (−$69 out of −$114). 
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Table C2. Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositions. 
 
  
Millennials vs. 
Silent/Boom 
GenX vs. 
Silent/Boom GenX vs. Silent Boom vs. Silent Boom vs. Greatest 
    Young adulthood Young adulthood Middle adulthood Middle adulthood Senior adulthood 
Charitable 
organizations 
Giving by younger 
generation 
157 298 551 751 974 
Giving by older 
generation 
315 347 770 758 1078 
Total difference in 
giving between 
older and younger 
generations 
–158 –49 –219 –7 –104 
Difference due to 
coefficient change 
– 147 – 134 – 269 – 221 – 500 
Difference due to 
income and wealth 
change 
– 11 84 50 214 396 
Congregations Giving by older 
generation 
380 536 673 1095 1398 
Giving by younger 
generation 
493 544 1262 1338 1724 
Total difference in 
giving between 
older and younger 
generations 
–114 –8 –589 –243 –326 
Difference due to 
coefficient change 
– 45 – 42 – 602 – 386 – 702 
Difference due to 
income and wealth 
change 
– 69 34 12 143 376 
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